Safety is a well-known and important class of property of software programs [4] (for instance, partial correctness is a safety property), and of systems in general.
Introduction
One of the biggest concerns in life is safety, commonly defined as, "The condition of being safe; freedom from danger, risk, or injury." As long as men have walked the Earth and cared for their well-being, they have wanted to be safe. Indeed, it has always been the norm that even being careless about safety is unacceptable.
There is an enormous amount of literature that pertains in some way or another to the topic of safety. Briefly, the important types of writings that are important may be said to be: (i) surveys on the topic of safety, such as [5] ;
(ii) those, such as [7] , that describe or analyze safety using temporal logic tools;
(iii) that treat of the concept of safety itself (or the related property of liveness) in a mathematical sense, e.g., [1] ;
(iv) those that propose specific methods to analyze the safety-or lack thereof-in systems and specifications, such as [2] .
Of these and other works cited, the most important is the paper by Alpern and Schneider [1] that defines safety and liveness.
Safety and Liveness in Concurrent Systems
Alpern and Schneider [1] define an execution σ of a concurrent program to be an infinite sequence of states s i :
The state s 0 is the initial state or the start state, and every state thereafter results from the execution of a single atomic action in the preceding state. If an execution terminates, then the final sequence is repeated forever to obtain an infinite sequence. A property of a (concurrent) program is a set P of such sequences. A program also specifies such a set Π of sequences of states. We say that a property holds for a program if Π ⊆ P.
Let S be the set of possible program states, S ω the set of infinite sequences of program states, and S * the set of finite sequences of program states. An execution of the program is specified by a member of S ω . Elements of S ω are called executions and those of S * are called partial executions. If an execution σ is in property P, this is shown as σ | = P. The partial execution consisting of the first i states of σ is shown as σ i .
Safety
The characterization of safety given by Lamport [4] that is current in the distributed computing literature is to refer to a general property where "something bad does not happen." A real-world example [3] for a traffic light that controls an intersection is the rule that lights in both directions shall not be green at once; if the system allows this to happen, it is not safe. Examples of safety properties from distributed computing [1] are mutual exclusion and partial correctness.
Safety is formally defined by Alpern and Schneider [1] as follows.
P is a safety property iff the following holds:
If P does not hold in an execution, then there is some specific point at which a "bad thing" happens. Such a "bad thing" may be anything discrete (i.e., it is possible to identify a specific process event as bad), and is always irremediable-once safety is violated, it stays violated. (This is considered true of safety here also, but not of the related property of hazard defined here-see section 4.)
Liveness
The property of safety is to be contrasted with that of liveness, also given by Lamport [4] as that "a good thing does happen." The latter property captures the notion of progress in systems, so liveness is also, in certain contexts, itself called "progress." A liveness property from the traffic light example [3] would be that every vehicle that is stopped at a red light is eventually given a green light to proceed. Examples of liveness properties in distributed computing [1] are starvation freedom, and termination.
Liveness is formalized by Alpern and Schneider [1] as follows.
P is a liveness property iff the following holds:
A partial execution α is live if and only if there is a sequence of states β such that αβ | = P. A liveness property holds if every partial execution is live.
Other Properties
It has been shown by Alpern and Schneider [1] that every property in a distributed system is the conjunction of a safety property and a progress property. Further, it is possible (at least in theory) to decompose any property into the logical conjunction of a safety property and a liveness property, using first-order predicate logic.
Computation-Theoretic Considerations about Safety and Liveness
Misra makes an informal claim [7] that a program property that is "always true" is akin to truth in mathematical logic, with an "invariant" being akin to provability. We carry the intuition further, and investigate the theoretical limitations on safety.
Undecidability-Reduction to Halting Problem
No safety protocol can provide every possible desirable safety property, just as no formal system in mathematical logic can possibly prove all true statements in arithmetic. This claim, though intuitively reasonable, has not been stated or given a formal proof until now. As noted previously, Alpern and Schneider [1] define an execution σ of a concurrent program to be an infinite sequence of states, with safety 1 and liveness 1 being defined accordingly.
There is more than one way of showing that safety and liveness are undecidable, but one of the easiest ways is possibly this. Let S ω be the set of countable-length strings of states of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) during execution. Without loss of generality, assume that the UTM halts (if it does) in a distinguished state χ that is different from all its states while running.
For safety, let β in the safety definition be the infinite sequence of χχχ . . . obtained by repeating the final state of the UTM when it halts. In other words, in this case the "bad thing" that must not happen is for the UTM to halt for a given program and data. (One reasonable real-life analogue of this safety requirement is, for example, in case of an operating system kernel program that must never terminate on its own.)
For liveness, let β in the liveness definition be the infinite sequence of states obtained by repeating the final state of the UTM when it halts. In other words, the "good thing" that must happen is that the UTM must halt for a given program and data. (Termination is a commonly cited liveness property.)
In either case, the following obtains. Therefore, safety and liveness are both undecidable.
NP-hardness of Safety
The fact that determination of a safety property is an NPhard problem is easy to understand and prove. A sketch of the idea may be given as follows. Let a system state consist of n boolean variables a i , and let a safety property of the system be stated as a predicate P on those variables; i.e., that the system is safe if P = TRUE and unsafe if P = FALSE. Then, evaluation of safety is clearly the same as SAT, the satisfiability problem in propositional logic, which is well known for being NP-complete. Therefore, by reduction to SAT, we see that safety is NP-hard. 
Safety and Hazard Analysis
In this section, we consider a way to assess system hazard, which may be informally described as its distance from a bad state. Therefore, rather than merely considering whether a system is presently in a bad state or not, we further subdivide states into classes based on the degree of hazard associated with them.
To do all this, however, we first have to specify a system lattice (which we call a safety lattice), and define the task of preserving safety, which is to allow the system to undergo state transitions without getting into a bad state.
System States
A system state is a collection of sub-system states, one for each in the system. (The sub-systems may be processes, registers with values, or systems of some other kind.) The execution of the system is considered to be divided into discrete intervals. The behavior of a system is completely determined by the states of its components.
The System-State Poset
The set of states taken by a system during an execution can be modeled as a poset, where a system state a b if b is reachable by a.
Definition 4.1. A state b is reachable from a state a, denoted a b, if b eventually occurs after a in some execution, but a does not occur after b in any.
Note that reachability as defined is a partial order: it is reflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.
However, unlike the formalism of Alpern and Schneider [1] , it is not assumed that state transitions are caused by single atomic events.
Without loss of generality, it may be assumed that there is a unique start state S. (If there are multiple start states, we just posit an earlier state that can lead to any of them.) It is clear that this description of possible system states forms a poset.
We consider only a finite set of states; even if the system is a reactive one and the set of states reached is (possibly) infinite, we consider only a finite fragment of interest. 
The Safety Lattice of a System
The system state poset can be extended into a lattice (a poset where every pair of elements has a greatest lower bound (glb) and a least upper bound (lub) for consideration of safety-related issues, as follows. We assume, in accordance with the definition of Alpern and Schneider [1] that once safety is lost because of a bad event, it stays lost. That is to say, there is no transition from a bad system state to a safe system state. For this reason, ⊥ is a dual atom in L S .
The following basic definition is useful. If there are multiple ⊥ states in L S with each one being a dual atom, it is possible to replace them with a lattice that has only one such that x ⊥ if any ⊥ is reachable from x. For this reason, we assume that there is only one ⊥ in L S .
Definition 4.4. A lattice is modular if the following (equivalent) conditions hold:
This reasoning may not be valid in cases where all bad events in the system are not considered alike or of similar "badness." However, for this initial development of the theory, such further considerations are not brought into the discussion. (Note that in the definition of safety by Lamport or its subsequent refinements by Alpern and Schneider or others, there is no formal notion of degrees of badness. All bad things are alike.) Definition 4.6. An execution path P e in the system is a subset of L S , where x i ∈ P e and 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, with x i x i+1 . The node x 0 is called the start node for the path and x n−1 is the end node. A path is complete if x 0 =0 and x n−1 =1.
We assume that execution paths are non-trivial, i.e., that they involve more than one node. Based on this, we can say the following. Proposition 4.8. The task of finding the existence of safe execution of the system is the same as determining the existence of a safe execution path P e , one where0 is the start node and1 is the end node, and ⊥ P e .
The above should illustrate the effort put into defining the safety lattice for the system, and the definitions used.
We can now refine the system states into suitable categories. (c) A node x ∈ L S is hazardous if x ⊥ and x y, for some y ∈ safe(L S ). The set of all hazardous nodes is denoted hazardous(L S ).
Bad
The set of all unsafe nodes is denoted unsafe(L S ).
The bad state has already been discussed. For the rest, we can informally call a node safe if the bad node is not reachable from it using any sequence of allowable system state transitions. The set of all such safe nodes is denoted as safe(L S ). Similarly, a node is called hazardous if the bad node is reachable from it using some sequence of system state transitions, but some safe node is also reachable from it. The set of all hazardous nodes is denoted by hazardous(L S ). A node is called unsafe if the bad node is reachable from it using every allowable sequence of system state transitions. (Thus, in a sense, the bad event is inevitable from an unsafe node.) The set of all unsafe nodes is denoted by unsafe(L S ). The motivation behind this is to pigeonhole0 as belonging to one of the sets. We consider the start state as a hazardous one for any safety lattice; if the set of safe nodes is empty, it is an unsafe one.
Likewise, ⊥ is a member of unsafe(L S ) as it fits Definition 4.9(d).
Note that the1 node cannot be labeled as belonging to any of these sets.
The following observations may be made about these sets. The first part just says that the four sets collectively make up the whole lattice (every node in the lattice belongs to one of the four sets described), and that no node can be both safe and unsafe, etc.
The second part says that any state reachable from a safe state is also safe, and that any state reachable from an unsafe state is also unsafe.
Both these observations follow from the definitions of these sets.
Based on the mathematical properties of a lattice and the definition, we can state the following. Proofs and discussion are omitted due to space constraints, but may be found in [8] .
Theorem 4.12. If x ∈ safe(L S ) and y ∈ unsafe(L S ), then x ↑ y =1.
To formalize the notion that in certain cases there may be no chance of getting into the bad state, we have the following.
Definition 4.14. An execution path P e is hazard-free if
Informally, we may say that an execution path is hazard-free if no node on it is either hazardous or unsafe. Note that the seemingly equivalent way of expressing the same notion, that P e is hazard-free if P e ⊆ safe(L S ), is inaccurate because1 safe(L S ) but we want to define a hazard-free path to be able to include1.
The following are immediate consequences of the above definition. 
Theorem 4.16.
A node x ∈ safe(L S ) iff x 1 and ∃y ∈ P e where P e is hazard-free, and y x.
Theorem 4.17. There is a hazard-free path P e in L S iff ∃x ∈ safe(L S ), where x is an atom.
We can now offer an important observation about the safety lattice.
Theorem 4.18. For any x ∈ unsafe(L
S ), y ∈ safe(L S ), z ∈ {1} ∪ hazardous(L S ),
the modularity conditions (see Definition 4.4) are satisfied.
It is of interest to compare the above with the result of Manolios and Trefler [6] , where the lattice is considered proper only if it is modular.
Here the lattice itself obviously need not be modular per se, but it satisfies a modularity property with respect to different types of nodes.
The situation can thus be represented by the Hasse diagram shown in Figure 1. 
Safety Function on System States
Given the previous discussion, we now develop a method by which a static analysis can be performed to mark system 
Definition 4.19. The function s(x) is defined as following:
The purpose of the function s : L S → {0, 1} is to assign a value to a system node x depending on whether a safe node is reachable from it.
Based on this definition, we can state the following, which says that a node is unsafe if no node reachable from it is safe. Similarly, we have the following definition.
Definition 4.21. The function r(x) is defined as following:
The purpose of the function r : L S → {0, 1} is to assign a value to a system node x depending on whether ⊥ is reachable from it.
Based on this, we can state the following, that a node is safe if and only if it can be reached from a safe node. Note that the above result can also be written as:
Observation 4.23. Given s(x) and r(x), we can determine the type of node x is, as follows: (i) If s(x)
(ii) If s(x) = 0 and r(x) = 1, then x ∈ hazardous(x).
(iii) If s(x) = 0 and r(x)
Note that the combination of s(x) = 1, r(x) = 0 cannot occur at any system node x other than1.
So we can now define the safety function as follows.
Definition 4.24. The safety function α : {L S − {1}} → {0, 1, 2} is given by:
Notice that the safety function is not defined for1. 
Hazard Function on System States
Considering the nature of hazards and lack of safety in real systems, it is necessary to find some way to note not just the fact that a certain state is unsafe or hazardous, but also the specific degree of the hazard involved with it.
Furthermore, upon consideration it is evident that there are two ways one can measure the degree of lack of safety at a system state. One is a transitional measure denoting what the increased hazard or lack of safety is in making a system transition to that node. The second is a measure denoting the sum of the hazards that have accumulated since the start state0 in arriving at that node. (In this we assume, as seems reasonable given empirical studies such as that of Leveson [5] , that hazards accumulate during system transitions, so that a system state carries with it not only new hazards activated during the last transition to it, but also ones that became apparent in previous transitions.)
The following functions formalize the notions of the two measures that may be applied.
Consider a hazard function β that may be informally described as the measuring the hazard involved in reaching a system state.
The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 4.27.
Under these conditions, the Möbius inversion theorem [9] applies, so that α can be expressed in terms of β by:
-where µ(x, y) is the Möbius function. As a consequence of this, we can state the following. (ii) If x, y ∈ safe(L S ) and x is only reachable through y, then β(x) = β(y).
(iii) If x, y ∈ P e where P e is a non-hazard-free path, and x y, then β(y) ≥ β(x).
Based on this, we can add an important definition.
Definition 4.29.
The cumulative hazard of an execution path P e is β(x i ),
Given this definition, we can say the following. 
Safety Algorithm
Given a safety lattice for which all the function values have been computed, it is possible to obtain a safe execution path using the following greedy approach. A S
• if the system is in state x and transitions are possible to one of the states {y 1 , . . . , y n }, where y i covers x,
• pick the transition to y k if α(y k ) = 0 for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n; else pick y j such that β(
The algorithm presented does the following-if a transition to a safe state is possible, it is chosen. Else, the transition chosen is to the state with the lowest hazard value. 
Applications
The application of the concepts presented is shown using two illustrative examples. The first is an example considering the safety requirement of a railroad crossing where the gate must be lowered to stop traffic before a train passes. The second example is the well-known Banker's problem. Other examples are possible but are omitted for brevity.1 
Train at a Railroad Crossing
The system in this case consists of a train, which approaches a crossing, and a gate, which must be lowered prior to the train's presence in the crossing, to be raised only after the train has passed. To represent this, we can use two boolean variables, g and t (with the meanings that when true, these indicate that the gate is down and the train is at the crossing). Let there be a further boolean variable arr, which, when true, indicates that a train is due to arrive at the crossing shortly.
This new variable does not itself cause the system state to be safe or unsafe, but it is used in signaling. In other words, if arr is set to true, then g must be set to true in order for t to be set to true.
Based on system knowledge, we can also say that ¬arr & g is impossible-the gate is not lowered if there is no signal. Similarly, arr does not become ¬arr until the train passes.
With this refinement, the system state lattice looks as shown.
The two bad states arr &t & g and ¬arr & t & g are shown separately, but can be collapsed into one for some analyses. The first state represents the condition where a signal is received but the gate is not lowered when the train is at the crossing; the second state represents the condition where the signal is not received and the train comes to the crossing without the gate being lowered.
The lattice demonstrates that a safe execution path exists in this system, and also shows the sequence of states that must be chosen for this path.
Banker's Problem
In this example, the banker starts with a certain amount of money, and has to service customer requests for loans. Every customer must be first given the full amount of his requested loan before he is obligated to return any money to the banker. An unsafe state is where the banker has 0 or more, but the remaining loans cannot be completed in any order. A safe state is where the banker has 0 or more, but the remaining laons can all be completed at once. A risky state is where where the banker has more than 0, the remaining laons can be completed in some order but not all at once. We can make the following observations. Observation 5.1. Given the banker's problem with one resource:
• If there is only one customer, then either safe(L S ) = ∅ or unsafe(L S ) = ∅.
• If the sum of all loan demands is less than b, the banker's initial amount, then unsafe(L S ) = ∅; if the smallest demand is greater than b, then safe(L S ) = ∅.
As an illustration, consider the situation of Figure 3 , where the banker initially has 40 florins, and has to service loan requests from two customers for 30 florins each. Loans are assumed to be made in increments of 10 florins.
The ordered pair (c 1 , c 2 ) indicates the current loans given to customer 1 and customer 2 respectively; for example, (10, 20) indicates that the first customer has been given 10 florins while the second has been given 20.
The bad state is (20, 20) (it is also the only unsafe state). The states (30, 0), (30, 10), (0, 30), (10, 30) are all safe. All other states are hazardous.
Conclusion
In the present paper, a method has been proposed to perform static analyses of a system using fundamental concepts from lattice theory. The basic task is to identify the partial order arising from system transformations, and to create a safety lattice based on what system state is considered bad. This can be done statically, i.e., prior to run-time, so that the health of the system is known without the difficulties associated with run-time analyses.
Based on the safety lattice for the system, it is then possible, as indicated in the previous section, to identify system states as being risky, safe or unsafe. The safety and hazard functions associate with each state in the system safety lattice values describing the nature of the state itself, and the amount of hazard associated with attempting to reach that node. Once again, the use of these functions is to label nodes with values to allow choices that minimize risks. Even among hazardous nodes, for instance, the risk function can help distinguish between nodes that have different potentials for causing concern, allowing executions to be planned accordingly.
